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Non-model capabilities · Nonprofit · 2026

What a deployed system can do that its model cannot.

Static evals measure the checkpoint. The interesting capabilities were built on top of it.

A frontier lab trains and evaluates a model. What gets deployed is a system: the model plus adapters and fine-tunes, attached data, a harness or control environment, other agents, and a user who keeps interacting with it. That system has capabilities the checkpoint alone does not have. They were not trained in, they are not on the model card, and no benchmark measures them. Redarc Labs builds the cases where the answer is known and checks whether the instruments can find it.

Thesis

Our thesis

A capability that was built on top only shows up when you intervene.

Vary the dose, add a sham arm, compare against a case where the answer is already known, and commit the verdict rule before the data exists. Four claims, each resting on a paper below.

01 Capabilities get added after release, and can be hidden.

An adapter installed a habit the checkpoint never had, a second adapter hid it behind baseline behaviour, and seven state-reading instruments could not tell the two apart.

Rests on · Known by Construction

02 Some capabilities exist only between components, not inside any one model.

Steer one agent's affect and a second agent's activations move with the dose. Neither model has that behaviour alone.

Rests on · Steered Affect

03 The instruments meant to read model internals have an unmeasured false-positive rate.

Probes, concept directions, and SAE features report confident findings on untrained networks, and fixed-dose steering audits mis-rank models for a reason unrelated to steering.

Rests on · Dead Salmons; Distance to the Boundary

04 How a model behaves inside a harness is decided by the harness as much as by the model.

Model organisms with objectives inserted at different training stages, run inside monitored and tool-restricted environments, to see what the overseer can and cannot detect.

Direction

Publications

Papers

Five papers at NeurIPS 2026 workshops. Workshop papers are non-archival.

2026 TAE: Can We Trust AI Evaluation? · NeurIPS 2026

Known by Construction: Calibrating Model-State Instruments Against Models Whose State Was Installed, Hidden, or Never Present

Manan Wadhwa*, Shivam Dubey*

Seven instruments that claim to read a model's internal state were tested on models where the state was installed, hidden, or absent by construction. Every one read the prompt or the training history instead.

Model organismsInstrument calibrationHidden objectives
2026 Interpreting Agent Behavior · NeurIPS 2026

Steered Affect Moves a Partner Agent's Activations, and the Logistic Probe That Reads It Returns a Tie-Break, Not an Estimate

Manan Wadhwa*, Shivam Dubey*, Debojeet Ghosh, Shreyansh Kumar, Ayushman Garg

One agent's steered emotional state shows up in a second agent's activations. The standard probe used to read it is a tie-break, not a measurement, and the standard ablation control is too weak to notice.

Multi-agentProbe reliabilitySteering Cohort 01 project
2026 Interpretability as a Science · NeurIPS 2026

Distance to the Boundary Is Not Steering Resistance

Manan Wadhwa*, Shivam Dubey*

Fixed-dose steering audits rank aligned models as least controllable because the model's margin grew, not because the steering direction weakened.

Steering auditsPost-trainingRefusal
2026 Interpretability as a Science · NeurIPS 2026

Dead Salmons Have a False-Positive Rate: A Calibrated Null-Model Test for Interpretability

Manan Wadhwa*, Shivam Dubey*

Probes, concept directions, and SAE feature selection report confident findings on networks that learned nothing. The shuffled-label control everyone runs does not catch it.

Null modelsFalse positivesSAEs
2026 Interpretability as a Science · NeurIPS 2026

Doubt Is a Decision: A Sparse Circuit Commits Language Models to "I Don't Know"

Sheryl Mehta*, Shagun Chadha*, Kanika Singhal*, Manan Wadhwa, Shivam Dubey

The decision to hedge lives in a small set of heads and neurons. Correlation-selected "confidence neurons" fail causal tests against a random-neuron null.

CircuitsUncertaintyCausal tests Cohort 01 project

* co-first author

Earlier work

2026 GenBio Workshop · ICML 2026
Toxin Feature Hierarchy in ESM-2

Shivam Dubey*, Manan Wadhwa*

Protein LMBiosecurity
2026 TAIS 2026
Loss Landscape Response to Adversarial Perturbation Is Architecture-Dependent

Shivam Dubey, Jason Hoelscher-Obermaier

Adversarial robustness
2025 Reliable ML from Unreliable Data · NeurIPS 2025
Fourier Gradient Regularisation for Adversarial Robustness

Shivam Dubey

Adversarial robustness
Directions

Open questions

Q1

Behaviour inside control environments

Does a model with an installed habit behave differently under monitoring and restricted tools than outside them, and can the overseer tell? A control environment makes the answer known by design, which is what the lab's method needs.

Q2

Persistence of hidden objectives

Which training stage makes an inserted objective survive retraining, distillation, and prompt variation? The model organisms come from the founders' MARS fellowship work at the Cambridge AI Safety Hub.

Q3

Capabilities between agents

Affect transfers between agents. What else does, and at what dose?

Q4

A calibrated instrument suite

Every instrument the lab has tested fails on a null it did not run. The long-term goal is a set of state-reading tools that ship with their own false-positive rate.

Team

Founders

Shivam Dubey

Co-Founder

BS Data Science, IIT Madras, 2023 to 2027

Five NeurIPS 2026 workshop papers
Co-first author
Toxin Feature Hierarchy in ESM-2
ICML 2026 GenBio Workshop
Fairness-Aware Speculative Decoding (FASD)
MIT Technology Review cited · 77% bias reduction at 6% latency overhead
Fourier Gradient Regularisation (FGR)
NeurIPS 2025 · 2× adversarial robustness on ResNet-18
Apart Research fellow
Under Jason Hoelscher-Obermaier · accepted TAIS Oxford
MARS V Research Fellow
Cambridge AI Safety Hub

Manan Wadhwa

Co-Founder

B.Tech Computer Science, MAIT (GGSIPU), expected 2027

Five NeurIPS 2026 workshop papers
Co-first author
Toxin Feature Hierarchy in ESM-2
ICML 2026 GenBio Workshop
MARS Research Fellow
Cambridge AI Safety Hub
Google Summer of Code 2026
HumanAI organisation
Technical AI Safety Fellow
AI Safety Initiative, Georgia Tech
BlueDot Impact
Technical AI Safety and Biosecurity certifications

Collaborators

Sheryl Mehta · Shagun Chadha · Kanika Singhal · Debojeet Ghosh · Shreyansh Kumar · Ayushman Garg. Co-authors on the two papers that came out of the first cohort.

Community

Teaching

The lab teaches an eight-session curriculum and runs it with cohorts. Two of the papers above came out of the first cohort.

Community